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Zoning in the Fourth Dimension
I. Introduction
The twin themes of sustained growth and complementary
land use controls have hallmarked the metamorphosis of New
York City. Historically, technical advancements in building
techniques in the late 19th century, along with the City's cen-
tralized location, assured the city of tremendous continuous
real estate development. Aided by steel beam construction,
the elevator and electricity, New York in a 30 year interval
evolved from a horizontal city to a vertical metropolis.' Seek-
ing to evolve with and regulate the City's transformance is the
law of land use controls.2
Traditionally, the City's planning bodies have sought to
draft regulations to enhance urban growth while protecting
the rights of individual inhabitants.' The City's present Plan-
ning Commission, in particular, has developed certain plan-
ning methods to expedite the regulation of urban develop-
ment.4 Some of the more expeditious measures have caused
1. See Alan, Development Rights Transfer in New York City, 82 Yale L.J. 338,
341-44 (1972).
2. This evolution has been illustrated in E. Basset, Zoning (1940) and S. Toll,
Zoned America (1969).
3. See generally New York City, Zoning Handbook, DCP 81-10 (5th ed. 1981).
See also Alan, supra note 1, at 338, and New York, N.Y., Zoning Res. §§ 31-00(g) and
(k). These sources state a dual legislative purpose which is to promote development,
while at the same time ameliorating the adverse effects of intensive development.
4. See Alan, supra note 1, at 347-348; New York, N.Y., Zoning Res. § 12-10
(1981) (which allows development capacity to be transferred to a contiguous lot); Id.
at § 74-79 (1981) (which allows development capacity to be transferred beyond a con-
tiguous lot for buildings that have been landmarked). See also Id. at § 74-95 (1984)
(allowing for 20"" additional floor area for complying with the Housing Quality De-
velopment Program), and Id. at §§ 81-50 to 53 (which allows for additional floor area
upon contribution of a public amenity). See generally N. Marcus & M. Groves, The
New Zoning: Legal Administrative and Economic Concepts and Technology (1970);
Marcus & Elliot, Euclid to Ramapo: New Directions in Land Development, 1 Hofstra
L. Rev. 56 (1973). These sources discuss the implementation of these new devices and
the creation of a single zoning authority.
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great controversy in the courts.' One of the more controversial
planning methods is the "zoning lot merger" or "transferable
air right" which is a form of transferable development rights.
The zoning lot merger law has raised environmental is-
sues regarding its adverse affect on the City's ability to con-
trol the density levels of the urban population. Moreover, the
law has created a controversy with respect to such legal issues
as the equitable allocation of these transferable development
rights, and the nature of the interest that is being transferred.
This study will analyze the zoning lot merger law by examin-
ing its history, environmental impact, recent court decisions
and possible legal precedents in order to illustrate its deficien-
cies and elucidate on a more coherent legal and equitable
interpretation.
II. History of the Zoning Lot Merger And Urban Density
Planning
The 1916 Zoning Resolution established the City's first
comprehensive zoning plan.7 The purpose of this plan was to
ameliorate the effects of huge shadows cast by the first sky-
scrapers upon the surrounding urban community.8 Building
5. Litigation involving transfers of air rights or zoning lot mergers is discussed
infra. Bonus zoning issues have also been a source of legal contention. See Trinity
Place Co. v. Finance Adm'r of N.Y., 38 N.Y.2d 144, 341 N.E.2d 536, 379 N.Y.S.2d 16
(1975); Trump-Equitable Fifth Ave. Co. v. Gliedman, 87 A.D.2d 12, 450 N.Y.S.2d 321
(1982); and Asian Am. for Equality v. Koch, No. 22491/83, slip op. (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
Aug. 6, 1984).
6. Transferring development rights is defined in New York, N.Y. Zoning Res.
§ 74-79 (1981) and zoning lot is defined in § 12-10; see infra note 21 and accompany-
ing text, and infra note 53 and accompanying text where the court attempts to distin-
guish a transfer of development rights from a transfer of air rights; and see generally
Marcus, Air Rights Transfer in New York City, 36 Law & Contemp. Probs. 372, 374
(1971) where the General Counsel of the City Planning Commission explains the zon-
ing lot merger as a transfer of air right§. But see Alan, supra note 1, at 338 n.4, and
infra note 161 and accompanying text.
7. Alan, supra note 1, at 338-40, and Zoning Handbook, supra note 3.
8. The development of modern day area zoning in New York is attributable to
the construction of the Equitable Life Building in 1916 whose structure cast a shadow
of seven acres over lower Manhattan effectively shutting off sunlight from surround-
ing buildings. New York courts have rejected the common law right to light that ex-
isted in England. Zoning may be seen as statute replacing the common law doctrine
with bulk, height and setback limitations. Coinciding with the development of area
2http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol3/iss1/4
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development, under this comprehensive plan,9 was regulated
through height and set back limitations 0 which limited the
size of buildings.1" City planners soon came to realize that
height and set back limitations, while altering building forms,
still permitted the crowding together of structures and en-
couraged separate building design. 2 Furthermore, these limi-
tations failed to directly regulate the density of the working
force, and this failure subsequently led to strains on munici-
pal services."
A. Urban Density Controls
Ultimately, city planners discovered that direct regulation
of density could be best achieved through a floor area ratio
(FAR).14 The FAR concept was first employed in the 1940s,
zoning was the concept of use zoning, which arose out of fears by affluent Fifth Ave-
nue inhabitants of the spread of the garment industry. See Alan, supra note 1, at
340-44. See, e.g., S. Toll, supra note 2, at 158-59.
9. N.Y.C. Charter & Admin. Code § 197(a) (Supp. 1977) defines comprehensive
plan:
The city planning commission shall be responsible for the conduct of plan-
ning relating to the orderly growth and improvement and future development
of the city, including adequate and appropriate resources for the housing,
business, industry, transportation, distribution, recreation, comfort, conve-
nience, health and welfare of its population ...
10. New York, N.Y. Zoning Res. § 12-10 (1981) defines "height factor" as, "equal
to the total floor area of the building divided by its lot coverage." Setback is defined
by New York, N.Y. Zoning Res. § 81-261 (1982) as, "[a] line drawn parallel to a street
line and showing for a given building height the minimum depth to which a building's
front wall is required to be set back from the street line by the applicable depth to
height chart." These factors are said to regulate the bulk of a building.
11. See Alan, supra note 1, at 342-43. The 30 years following the enactment of
the zoning resolution witnessed rapid real estate development in the midtown area.
For reference to this growth, see generally id. at 432, and Toll, supra note 2. See also
Rifkin, TDR's are a Growth Industry in the Regulation of Land Use, 136 N.Y.L.J. at
34, col.3 (Nov. 18, 1981).
12. See Alan, supra note 1, at 344.
13. Height and bulk limitations may be overcome by compacting ceiling space.
Id. at 346; see also Comment, Building Size, Shape and Placement Regulations:
Bulk Control Zoning Reexamined, 60 Yale L.J. 506, 514-15 (1951).
14. This ratio represents the total allowable floor area of a building divided by
its lot area. For example, a 10,000 sq. ft. lot with a FAR set at 12 would have a
120,000 sq. ft. maximum floor area, and consequently a lot zoned for a FAR index of
15 would have a 150,000 sq. ft. maximum floor area space. See Zoning Handbook,
supra note 3, at 9 (5th ed. 1981). By directly limiting the available working floor area,
3
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but for reasons traced to conflicting political interests, it was
not fully incorporated as a land use control device until the
1961 zoning resolution amendment.15 The FAR controls, con-
templated by city planners, were seen by developers as a limi-
tation on the growth of their industry. 6 Developers argued
that setting the FAR too low would make it impossible to
erect the type of building being demanded by their corporate
sponsors.1 7 Furthermore, the developers explained that FAR
limitations on small size lots would make a building less effi-
cient because relatively more space would be consumed by el-
evator shafts and other service structures." The competing
factions eventually compromised.
The compromise employed two innovative planning de-
vices.Y' The first device known as a "bonus device," permitted
the developer to increase his floor space by twenty percent if
he in return incorporated into the development a public
amenity. The second device, and the one which would prove
more costly, was the "contiguous lot assemblage siphoning
principle" or "zoning lot merger" for short. 0 The zoning lot
merger was created by liberalizing the definition of the zoning
the FAR was able to directly affect the size of the work force. Thus, by doubling the
FAR index on a given lot, theoretically you would be doubling the size of the work
force. See also Alan, supra note 1, at 345-46, and New York, N.Y. Zoning Res. § 12-10
which defines floor area as "the sum of the-gross areas of the several floors of a build-
ing or buildings measured from the exterior faces of exterior walls or from the center
lines of walls separating two buildings. ... This concept includes the basement,
elevator shafts, penthouses, attic spaces, terraces, covered plazas, accessory buildings
and certain accessory parking spaces.
15. See Alan, supra note 1, at 346.
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. City planners arrived at a FAR level of 15 for the commercial districts. They
believed this level would serve the needs for office capacity through 1975. Notwith-
standing the planners' findings, a powerful coalition of city developers and realtors
objected strongly to any reduction in the FAR regulations below an index of 18. Id.
19. Id. at 347-48.
20. Id. at 348 n. 57. But see Matter of Brause, 140 N.Y.L.J. 108 at 13, col. 5
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. Dec. 5, 1958). This case notes that zoning capacity mergers had been a
common practice between developers and city planning even before the 1961 zoning
resolution amendments. In this case, however, the court finally rejected the principle
because there was no specific statutory authority authorizing such mergers. In this
light the political compromise may be seen as a readoption of a previous common
practice.
4http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol3/iss1/4
1985] FOURTH DIMENSION
lot, from which a FAR value was computed.2'
The new definition allowed a developer who wished to
build on his lot to borrow additional unused FAR (or transfer
the air rights as some courts like to refer to it) from an adja-
cent developed lot by merging their respective lots into "sin-
gle ownership. 2 2 To illustrate the effect of the zoning lot defi-
nition one should imagine two adjacent lots, each zoned at a
FAR level of 15. The owner of lot 1, developer A, wishes to
develop his empty lot with more floor area than he is allowed
under the Zoning Resolution. B, the owner of lot 2, already
has a building on lot 2, but his building has only consumed 12
of his available FAR of 15. Consequently, by declaring the lots
to be under single ownership, B may transfer to A an addi-
tional FAR capacity of 3. (This result may be achieved by
subtracting the 15 FAR he is presently zoned for from the 12
FAR he has used.) A, owner of lot 1, may now build his build-
ing to a FAR level up to 18 or 1/5 greater than he was previ-
ously allowed. 3
Futhermore, ownership of a zoning lot and its FAR ca-
21. Under New York, N.Y. Zoning Res. § 12-10 (1971)(amended 1981), reprinted
in Newport Assoc. v. Solow, 30 N.Y.2d 263, 265, 283 N.E.2d 600, 602, 332 N.Y.S.2d
617, 219 (1972), a zoning lot was defined as:
(a) a lot of record existing on the effective date of this resolution or any ap-
plicable subsequent amendment thereto, or (b) a tract of land, either unsub-
divided or consisting of two or more contiguous lots of record, located within
a single block, which on the effective date of this resolution or any applicable
amendment thereto, was in single ownership, or (c) a tract of land, located
within a single block, which at the time of the filing for a building permit (or,
if no building permit is required, at the time of the filing for a certificate of
occupancy), is designated by its owner or developer as a tract all of which is
to be used, developed, or built upon as a unit under single ownership.
The zoning lot definition was further clarified by the statute:
1. Zoning lot may or may not coincide with a lot on a tax map or recorded
subdivision plate.
2. A zoning lot may be subdivided into two or more zoning lots and all build-
ing thereon shall comply with the applicable provision of the zoning
resolution.
3. A zoning lot must consist of parcels that are contiguous for at least 10
linear feet.
Id.
22. See infra note 64 and accompanying text.
23. Provided he still complied with overall height and setback limitations. See
supra note 10.
5
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pacity under the "contiguous lot assemblage siphoning princi-
ple" did not refer to fee ownership, but rather was defined,
"to include a lease of not less than 50 years duration, with an
option to renew such lease so as to provide a total lease of not
less than 75 years duration. '24 Through the use of the zoning
lot a developer could merge his lot into single ownership by
lease, fee ownership, tenancy, or partnership 6 and acquire the
excess development capacity of the transferor lot by "siphon-
ing" the FAR to the contiguous parcel.26
B. Implementation of the Contiguous Lot Assemblage
Siphoning Principle and its Impact on the Urban
Environment
The zoning lot merger is a method of increasing your floor
area ratio without having to obtain a variance, 27 or special ex-
ception permit" from the City Planning Commission or Zon-
ing Board of Appeals. In fact, all that is necessary is a build-
ing permit from the Department of Buildings." In a sense, the
developer's added capacity acquired through the zoning lot
24. See supra note 21.
25. 873 Third Ave. Corp. v. Kenvic Assoc., 190 N.Y.L.J. 3 at 6 col. 4 (N.Y. Sup.
Ct. July 6, 1983).
26. The resolution failed to address the problem of default by a lessee and possi-
ble remedies in case of default, nor did it contemplate the effect of the reversion on
the lessee's compliance with the zoning resolution. Possibly it was felt that the rever-
sion would have no value, but this theory would not comport with economic reality.
On this matter the General Counsel for the New York City Planning Comission
stated "[11n accepting a long term lease as lot control comparable to fee ownership
the city looked at the useful life of the new structure as measured by the standard
mortgage terms."
Marcus & Groves supra note 4, at 373.
27. "A variance is an authorization for the construction or maintenance ...of a
use of land, which is prohibited by a zoning ordinance. It is a right granted by a
board of zoning appeals .. " R. Anderson, New York Zoning Law and Practice, §
23.02, at 159 (3d ed. 1984).
28. "A special use permit differs from a variance in that the former contemplates
a use expressly permitted by a particular zoning ordinance while the latter is author-
ity to use property in a manner which is otherwise prohibited." Id. at 267.
29. The Department of Buildings requires that a N.Y. title insurance company
first join all interested parties. Rifkin, Utilizing TDR in New York City, Title News,
at 17 (August 1981).
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merger is "as of right."30
It should be noted that in order for a developer to have
incentive to employ the merger system he must be restrained
from seeking other alternatives such as a special exception
permit or a zoning variance. In order to direct a developer to
the zoning lot merger alternative, the comprehensive plan re-
stricts available FAR as close to a constitutional limit as pos-
sible.31 Relief from bulk, height and FAR regulations which
would be available from the Zoning Board of Appeals under a
Standard Zoning Enabling Act (SZEA) 31 is limited by a re-
quirement that the Zoning Board's decisions must be ap-
proved by the City Planning Commission in certain instances
and voted on by the Board of Estimate in others.3 3 Further-
30. "As of right" building is the term used to describe a development which com-
plies with the zoning requirement of its district and for which the Department of
Buildings may issue a building permit without having to refer to the Planning Com-
mission or the Board of Standards and Appeals. See Zoning Handbook, supra note 3.
31. R. Anderson, New York Zoning Law and Practice, §§ 8,16 (2nd ed. 1973).
Also a lot merger can add directly to tax revenue for the City, whereas a variance or
an exception does not. The lot mergers are characterized as taxable exchanges of real
property or an interest in real property. Taxable exchanges are:
[A]ny document, instrument or writing other than a will, regardless of where
made, executed or delivered, whereby real property or interest therein is cre-
ated, vested, granted, bargained, sold, transferred, assigned or otherwise con-
veyed, including any such document, instrument or writing whereby any
leasehold interest in real property is granted, assigned or surrendered.
N.Y.C. Admin. Code, ch. 46, tit. II, § 46-1.0 (1984) and regulation article 3(b) which
states, "[t]he term includes transfers of excess zoning rights in connection with zon-
ing lot mergers and transfers of development rights from landmark designated parcels
to nearby parcels." N.Y. Tax Rep. (CCH) P356-903 (June 1985). See e.g., Rifkin,
supra note 29, at 19; Kuntz & Opar, Development Rights Transfer: Whose Sky is it
Anyway, 192 N.Y.L.J. 33, at col. 3 (1981).
32. The original New York City zoning ordiance was the inspiration for the Stan-
dard Zoning Enabling Act (SZEA) which was a state uniform zoning act, passed by
most states during the city planning movement in the 1920's. In its original form the
SZEA envisioned a zoning ordinance and map drafted by professional planners and a
planning board, which regulated the present and future development of the commu-
nity. Ellickson & Tarlock, Land Use Controls 39-41 (1981).
Individual relief in the form of a variance or special permit from the strictures of
the zoning ordinance could be made by an administrative review board, the Zoning
Board of Appeals, with appellate jurisdiction. The SZEA envisioned a zoning dichot-
omy where professional, planners drafted legislation, and the Board of Appeals pro-
vided relief for certain individual cases where literal enforcement of the provision of
the ordinance would result in unnecessary hardship. Id. at 217.
33. Urban planners, frustrated by decisions of the Zoning Board of Appeals, have
1985]
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more, the Zoning Board's jurisdiction is restrained by strict
standards limiting the definition of hardship, 4 needed for a
use variance which may alter floor area.35
Zoning lot mergers have been criticized for undermining
regulations controlling density and congestion.36 Although the
new floor area permitted by the transfer is deemed to have
been previously allocated to a district, this theory ignores the
fact that the FAR transferred was previously unused.37 Un-
used FAR did not add to the district's overall needs for light
and air, open space, transportation and utilities.38 Transform-
eroded the jurisdiction of the Zoning Board of Appeals to provide relief. Id. at 220-21.
The New York City zoning resolution limits the jurisdiction to grant special permits
to specific catagories. See New York, N.Y., Zoning Res. § 74-01 (1983). The City
Planning Commission has the authority to appeal to State Supreme Court if it finds
that a variance or permit issued by the Zoning Board of Appeals would have an ad-
verse impact on the community. See N.Y.C. Admin. Code tit. 6, § 668(e)(1).
Furthermore, concurrent jurisdiction to offer special permits is given to the City
Planning Commission upon approval by the Board of Estimate. New York, N.Y., Zon-
ing Res. § 74-01 (1983). See also Anderson, supra note 27, at §§ 13.16, 17.33 and
18.07-08.
34. Use variances require an applicant to overcome the strict standard of proof
of unnecessary hardship. See Otto v. Steinhilber, 282 N.Y. 71, 24 N.E.2d 851 (1939)
where the court ruled the landowner must prove; (1) the land cannot yield a reasona-
ble return under its present use, (2) that there are unique circumstances which are a
result of the zoning resolution, and (3) that the use will not alter the essential charac-
ter of the locality. New York, N.Y., Zoning Res. § 72-21 (1981).
Some court decisions have held that use variances are necessary in order to in-
crease floor area. Ennis v. Crowley, 12 A.D.2d 999, 211 N.Y.S.2d 500 (1961); but see,
Pondfield Road Co. v. Bronxville, 1 N.Y.2d 841, 135 N.E.2d 725, 153 N.Y.S.2d 221
(1956).
35. Proponents of these new zoning devices plan to eliminate the conventional
zoning dichotomy into a single zoning administrative agency and force developers to
bargain with these agencies in order to gain relief. See Marcus & Groves, supra note
4; Marcus & Elliot, supra note 4.
One effect of this centralized planning could be a stifling of development in areas
in which a centralized agency is not concentrating. See generally Hinds, New Hous-
ing Lags in Outer Boroughs, N.Y. Times, April 14, 1985, § 8 (real estate), at 1, which
notes that present zoning has stifled development in the outer boroughs. See also the
proposed state charter amendments which proposed a single Zoning Board within the
City Planning Department in Preliminary Recomendations of The State Charter Re-
visions for New York City at 120 (1975) (unpublished pamphlet).
36. Alan, supra note 1, at 339.
37. Id.
38. Id. See also Oser, A Dissenting Voice on Transferring Air Rights, N.Y.
Times, June 16, 1985, § 8 (real estate), at 7, col. 1; Wedemeyer, Trading Up and
Upon a Development Site, N.Y. Times, Nov. 24, 1985, § 8 at 18, col. 1 (which dis-
8http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol3/iss1/4
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ing previously unusable floor area into unregulated occupied
floor space can have detrimental effects on the surrounding
locality. One planner in an empirical study stated that, "sub-
way traffic at express stops increased roughly in proportion to
the increase in rentable floor space." 39 By encouraging the in-
tensification of actual as opposed to theoretical urban density
development, the zoning lot merger has circumvented the pur-
pose of density controls."
A much more practical way to promote development
while regulating its detrimental effects upon the population
density in the surrounding community would be through bo-
nus zoning. With this approach variances or special exceptions
could be granted on a condition that the developer create an
open public plaza or improve the traffic flow to existing local
subway stations. Furthermore, with the bonus zoning method
the threshold issue would not rest upon the theory of unused
FAR, but would instead be determined by the actual needs for
open space and light and air in a given block."1
III. Equitable Allocations of Transferable Air Rights
The zoning lot merger is in essence an interest created by
a statute that confers a valuable economic and legal benefit to
the holder of the interest. The interest, which is relatively new
to jurisprudence, can also result in a financial windfall for its
holder.42 In order to avoid the possibility of conferring such a
cusses how a developer can "pyramid" the available floor area by merging zoning lots
with the surrounding zoning lots).
39. Alan, supra note 1, at 345.
40. Id. at 339.
41. For some examples of bonus zoning regulations see supra note 4.
42. The buying and selling of transferred air rights is a multi-million dollar busi-
ness in New York City. See, Wedemeyer supra note 38; Scardino, Trading Air to
Build Towers, N.Y. Times, February 21, 1986, § D, at 1, col. 2, where the author notes
that developers can make money out of thin air. Such an economic benefit conferred
on certain developers to the detriment of the surrounding community would not be
included in the state enabling act which delegates the power to zone to the city. See
N.Y. Const. art 9, § 2 (McKinney 1969). This act requires that the zoning power be
used to promote the general welfare of the entire community rather than a select
class. Cf. Southern Burlington County NAACP v.Township of Mt. Laurel, 67 N.J.
151, 336 A.2d 713; cert. denied, 423 U.S. 808 (1975), Mt. Laurel II, Southern Burling-
ton County NAACP v. Township of Mt. Laurel, 92 N.J. 158, 456 A.2d 390 (1983).
1985]
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windfall to one person the drafters of the statute have sought
to allocate the interest in an equitable fashion.43 However, the
apparent ambiguity in the drafting of the legislation, and the
judiciary's uncertainty as to the nature of the interest that is
transferred has resulted in certain legal controversies.
A. Early Court Decisions Interpreting the Allocation of
Transferable Air Rights
Although the New York courts have disagreed in their le-
gal interpretations of § 12-10 and in the equitable allocation
of transferable air rights, the courts have generally approved
of the zoning lot merger principle. In one early case, Hotel
Taft Assoc. v. Sommers,44 a court ruled that the zoning laws
would be violated if a building was erected in the air space
already dedicated to another building in a zoning lot merger."
The defendant, Sommers, raised the issues of whether all the
excess air rights were transferred by his predecessor in inter-
est, Rockefeller Center, Inc., and whether he, the present
This New Jersey interpretation of the state enabling act was adopted by one court in
New York in Asian Am. for Equality v. Koch, No. 22491/83, slip op. (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
August 6, 1984). These decisions deal with affirmative zoning for moderate and low
income housing.
43. The statute allows parties other than the fee owner to determine whether or
not the air rights may be transferred. These parties are referred to as parties in inter-
est. See the legislative history to § 12-10 in New York, N.Y. Bd. of Estimate J. calen-
der no. 283 (July 13, 1977).
44. Hotel Taft v. Sommers, 34 Misc. 2d 367, 226 N.Y.S.2d 155 (Sup. Ct. 1962).
This case is not the earliest decision on transferred air rights. See Matter of Brause,
140 N.Y.L.J. 108 at 13, col. 5 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Dec. 5, 1958).
45. The history of this case proves interesting. The plaintiff sought to enjoin the
defendant from building on a lot from which he had already transferred air rights.
The defendant's predecessor in interest, Rockefeller Center, Inc., owners of the Roxy
Theater, agreed to give plaintiff, the Hotel Taft, (a contiguous lot) an easement for
light and air. The easement restricted defendant from building directly across from
the southern portion of plaintiff's lot where an atrium was located. Thirty years later,
Rockefeller Center, Inc. entered into an agreement, the "Tower Privilege Agreement"
with Rock-Time, Inc. whose lot, the Time Life lot, was east of and contiguous to the
Roxy Theater. In this agreement Rockefeller Center, Inc. consented to the inclusion
of the Roxy property's unused air rights in computing the zoning lot area of the
Time-Life lot. The Time-Life lot before the agreement had a 169 foot height capac-
ity. Following the agreement, they could build to a height of 644 feet. (The court here
does not use FAR values.) Hotel Taft, 34 Misc. 2d at 373, 226 N.Y.S.2d at 160.
10http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol3/iss1/4
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owner of the lot was bound by the transfer of air rights repre-
sented by a previously executed agreement. The court held
that § 9G of the New York City Zoning Resolution (a prede-
cessor to § 12-10) would be violated if a building was erected
in the space dedicated to enable a contiguous lot to build. The
court also held that the plaintiff, although not a party to the
agreement, could avail itself of this agreement even though it
did not relate directly to plaintiff's property and the plaintiff
was not a legal beneficiary.46
The implications of this decision are clear. First, a non-
party to an air right transfer could bring an action to enjoin
the violation of a transfer agreement, and the court assumed
that it was "dedicating air space" without ever defining what
"dedicating" or what "air rights" are. Secondly, the court ac-
knowledged that it would uphold a "dedication" of air space
across separate but contiguous fees and subsequently bind
each party to the transfer.47 Finally, the court acknowledged
indirectly that the transferor lot was burdened to a poten-
tially perpetual limitation on its development capacity under
the present Zoning Resolution.' s
1. The Courts Approve the Leasing and Transferance of
City Owned Air Rights
Private parties have not been the only ones to take ad-
vantage of the financial windfall created by the zoning lot
merger. During the 1960's the State of New York promulgated
legislation that allowed municipalities to lease the air rights
over publically owned property.'9 This legislation delegates,
"authority to local governments to acquire and develop air
46. Id. at 374-75, 226 N.Y.S.2d at 161.
47. Id.
48. The court assumed what the parties were dedicating air space to another lot
without ever defining the nature of the interest being dedicated. Id. at 374, 226
N.Y.S.2d at 161. The effect of such a dedication on the market value of the building
for appraisal and tax assessment purposes has yet to be decided by a court although
the opportunity has subsequently arisen. See Rice v. Ritz Assoc., 58 N.Y.2d 923, 447
N.E.2d 58, 460 N.Y.S.2d 510 (1983); Trump-Equitable Fifth Ave. Co. v. Gliedman, 87
A.D.2d 12, 450 N.Y.S.2d 321 (App. Div. 1982).
49. N.Y. Gen. Mun. Law § 502(7)(McKinney 1982).
19851
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rights and easements as part of urban renewal projects."50
Consequently, the City of New York initiated legislation to
lease the air rights over city owned property.51 In 1966, New
York City began a program of leasing the air rights over pub-
lic schools to contiguous lots under commercial development,
with the revenue flowing from these leases going to the Edu-
cational Construction Fund.52
A New York court has approved the transfer of city
owned air rights.53 In its decision the court has left the fate of
municipally owned property to the discretion of the municipal
officials, limited only by the requirement that the transfer be
rationally related to the public interest.5 4 In Fur-lex Realty
Inc. v. Lindsay, the City entered into an agreement whereby
the "air rights" above a section of the Appellate Division
Courthouse were leased to a contiguous lot owner, 41 Madis-
ion Avenue Corp.5 To effectuate this deal the City merged
the lot on which the courthouse stood with the developer's lot
in order to form a single zoning lot.5 6
The court held that the lease rental of $46,000.00 per year
over the term of the lease and the $173,000.00 estimated tax
revenue per year were conclusive evidence that the agreement
was in the public interest.57 Furthermore, the court held that
the transfer of "air space" did not violate the city's compre-
hensive zoning ordinance and, therefore, did not constitute
50. Warren's Weed, New York Law of Real Property, Air Rights, § 1.03 at 119
(Supp. 1983).
51. New York, N.Y., Admin. Code ch. 15, tit. A, § 384-1.0 (1976).
52. N.Y. Educ. Law § 403-a (McKinney Supp. 1984).
53. See Fur-Lex Realty Inc. v. Lindsay, 81 Misc. 2d 904, 367 N.Y.S.2d 388 (N.Y.
Sup. Ct. 1975).
54. A decision by a zoning authority to provide relief must be rationally related
to a comprehensive plan. Euclid v. Amber Realty, 272 U.S. 365 (1926).
55. Fur-Lex Realty, Inc., 81 Misc. 2d at 905, 367 N.Y.S.2d at 390. The lot owner
was located at the southeastern corner of Madison Avenue and 26th Street. The lease
allowed the developer to acquire 100,000 sq. ft. of additional floor area, which enabled
him to build an additional ten floors. Id. at 905-06, 367 N.Y.S.2d at 390.
56. This merger was accomplished through a 75 year lease from the City to the
developer and a subsequent sub-lease by the developer back to the City. Id. at 907,
367 N.Y.S.2d at 391.
57. Id. at 910, 367 N.Y.S.2d at 392.
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impermissible "spot zoning. '58
Although the practice of leasing city air rights to adjoin-
ing lots has passed judicial inquiry thus far, there are other
questions concerning the sensibility of these leasing practices.
The short run benefits of the increased revenue these leases
provide should be balanced against the long term effect of
binding city property to an agreement against development5 9
Neither the Planning Commission nor the courts have ad-
dressed several glaring issues, such as what occurs when the
present use of the transferor lot is no longer of use to the
city. 0
Furthermore, there are issues concerning the rights of a
lessor of a zoning lot against a defaulting lessee, as well as a
concern for the lessor's reversionary right at the expiration of
the lease term."' If the air rights do revert back at some point,
the transferee lot may be thrown into a violation of the city's
zoning ordinance.62 The lessee and lessor may have previously
58. Id. at 907, 367 N.Y.S.2d at 391. Spot zoning is defined as, "the process of
singling out a small parcel of land for a use classification totally different from that of
the surrounding area, for the benefit of the owner of such property and to the detri-
ment of other owners. ... Anderson, supra note 27, § 5.04 at 164.
59. City officials, buoyed by the additional revenues these leases provide the City
coffers, may have acted spuriously. Some courts have held that the City will be bound
by their restrictive "Zoning Declarations." A Zoning Declaration is an agreement exe-
cuted by the developer and the City and is recorded. See Zoning Handbook, supra
note 3. The covenants are said to bind the developer to the terms of the declaration.
See Flushing Property Owners Ass'n. v. Planning Comm'n of N.Y., 43 A.D.2d 515,
349 N.Y.S.2d 318 (App. Div. 1973); but see Collard v. Incorporated Village of Flower
Hill, 52 N.Y.2d 594, 421 N.E.2d 818, 439 N.Y.S.2d 326 (1981) where this court held
that city property would not be bound by zoning restrictions.
60. Such demographic factors as the increasing age of our population portend a
dwindling need for educational facilities. If the city has entered into a zoning lot
agreement it may leave itself with unmarketable property. See Anderson, supra note
31, § 9.02 at 425. The author notes that a village is not subject to zoning restrictions
in performance of its governmental as distinguished from its corporate or proprietary
activities.
61. See Marcus, From the Legislatures, 6 Real Est. L.J. 336, 337 (1978). Here
the author concedes that interpretive problems led to the amendment of the zoning
lot definition. In order to solve the problem of having a possible nonconforming use
situation upon reversion, § 12-10 provides that a zoning lot may not be subdivided
into a nonconforming use. This solution, however, would not solve the conflicting
claims to the value of the reversionary interests.
62. This violation is known as a nonconforming use which is defined as a use
13
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agreed that the residual value of the air rights have been fully
exhausted (amortized), but such an agreement would not re-
flect the lot's true economic and development potential. One
can also foresee a number of marketing problems for the
owner of a transferee lot. Few potential tenants would be will-
ing to sign long term leases with this potential cloud on the
building's title."'
2. The Courts Approve the Transference of Air Rights by a
Building Lessee Despite the Owner's Objection
The provision of the zoning resolution defining ownership
as a lease for a period of 75 years or more leaves three possi-
ble scenarios: (1) an owner lessor transfers the air rights to his
building despite a long term building lessee's objections; (2)
the lessee (or owner) acquires air rights to build an additional
structure to the one he presently leases (or owns); and (3) the
lessee of a lot transfers air rights to a contiguous lot which he
already owns despite his landlord's objection. The third scena-
rio was considered by New York State's highest court in New-
port Assoc. v. Solow.6 4
In this case, the court ruled that the zoning resolution did
not define air rights in terms of real property ownership, but
rather as a form of ownership defined by and derived from the
resolution itself." The plaintiff, the owner of a fee parcel im-
proved with a building on 4 West 58th Street, brought an ac-
tion to compel a determination of a claim to real property (the
air rights). Defendant was a long term lessee of plaintiff's
building and in addition owned two contiguous lots which he
which does not comply with use restrictions applicable to the area in which it is situ-
ated. See Anderson, supra note 27, § 6.02 at 199; New York, N.Y., Zoning Res. § 52-
01 (1982). The zoning resolution provides several methods for dealing with a noncon-
forming use ranging from prohibiting certain structural rehabilitation to uncompen-
sated condemnation of the structure following a statutory amortization period. See
New York, N.Y., Zoning Res. § 52-10 (1982).
63. See infra note 174 and accompanying text. Also title insurance companies
would not give a special zoning endorsement under this circumstance.
64. Newport Assoc. v. Solow, 30 N.Y.2d 263, 283 N.E.2d 600, 332 N.Y.S.2d 617
(1972).
65. Id. at 268, 283 N.E.2d at 604, 332 N.Y.S.2d at 621.
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sought to develop. At issue was whether the developer, a long
term lessee, could merge lots which he owned in fee with his
lessor's lot, despite the lessor's objection, and transfer the air
rights represented by the lessor's unused excess FAR. 66
In addressing this issue the court looked first at the lease
signed by lessor and lessee. Despite the fact that the lease was
executed before the zoning lot resolution became effective and
that § 4.02 of the lease limited structural changes or altera-
tions to the building, the court held that the lessee may merge
his lot with the adjacent lot that he owned despite his lessor's
objection.6 7 The court reasoned that § 12-10 of the zoning res-
olution allowed such a merger, 68 because § 12-10 defined own-
ership of the superadjacent air rights as a lease of a building
for 75 years or more. 9 The court noted that in as much as
there was no provision in the lease which precluded the les-
sees from exercising this transfer, it could not be found that
the lessor was wronged.7 0 Futhermore, commenting on the lost
residuary value of the lessor's asset the court stated:
[T]his overlooks the fact, in view of defendant's owner-
ship of the adjoining building, his lease from plaintiff and
the Zoning Resolution itself, plaintiff possesses no such
right of sale. There is nothing in the ordinance which
treats its reversionary interest as ownership for the pur-
pose of Floor Area Ratios or air space rights... whatever
rights that plaintiff may otherwise have had were not lost
by any act of the defendant, but rather as a result of the
operation of the ordinance.7 1
The Newport Assoc. decision disconcerted the real estate
community. 72 The court's holding that the owner of the rever-
sionary interest in the leasehold estate was not the owner for
the purpose of FAR or air rights appeared to many to be a
66. Id. at 265, 283 N.E.2d at 603, 332 N.Y.S.2d at 620.
67. Id. at 268, 283 N.E.2d at 604, 332 N.Y.S.2d at 621.
68. Id. at 267, 283 N.E.2d at 604, 332 N.Y.S.2d at 621.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Id. at 268, 283 N.E.2d at 604, 332 N.Y.S.2d at 621.
72. Rifkin, supra note 11, at 34.
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taking of a valuable asset from the present owner.73 Some con-
temporary critics of the decision believe that the court of ap-
peals confused the concept of air rights and transferable de-
velopment rights.7 '
B. New York City Amends § 12-10
The controversy caused by the Newport Assoc. decision
ultimately led to an amendment of § 12-10.15 Under this
amended section, effective August 18, 1977, a New York State
title insurance company is required to certify that "each party
in interest" has been joined in an agreement with respect to a
merger of a zoning lot or has waived their rights in a declara-
tion of merger. 7a Party in interest in the "tract of land" re-
ferred to in the declaration consists of the following:
(iv) A "party in interest" in the portion of the tract of
land covered by a Declaration shall include only (W) the
fee owner or owners thereof, (X) the holder of any en-
forceable recorded interest in all or part thereof which
would be superior to the Declaration and which could re-
sult in such holder obtaining possession of any portion of
such tract of land, (Y) the holder of any enforceable re-
corded interest in all or part thereof which would be ad-
versely affected by the Declaration, and (Z) the holder of
any unrecorded interest in all or part thereof which would
73. Penn Central Transp. Co. v. New York, 438 U.S. 103 (1978). These cases
stand for the proposition that barring an outright physical taking of the property by
the City, the court will not find a taking, rather the affected party must claim a due
process (over burdensome regulation) violation; Fred F. French Investing Co. v. New
York, 39 N.Y.2d 587, 350 N.E.2d 381, 385 N.Y.S.2d 5 (1976), appeal dismissed, 429
U.S. 900 (1976).
74. Rifkin, supra note 29, at 16 n.5.
75. Id. at 17. These amendments were also made for the purpose of encouraging
the parties to record their lot merger document in order to provide notice to a subse-
quent purchaser. See Marcus, supra note 61, at 339.
76. New York, N.Y., Zoning Res. § 12-10 (1981). Zoning lots merged prior to
August 18, 1978 are protected by a grandfather clause which allows the old law to
apply. This clause has caused much controversy on the issue of whether or not a lease
of a zoning lot needs to be recorded in order for the clause to apply. Marcus, supra
note 61, at 338. See 873 Third Ave. Corp. v. Kenvic Assoc., 109 A.D.2d 489, 494
N.Y.S.2d 727 (App. Div. 1985).
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be superior to and adversely affected by the Declaration
and which would be disclosed by a physical inspection of
the land covered by the Declaration. 7
This section, like its predecessor, allows a lot to be
merged while the "tract of land" remains in separate fee own-
ership.78 Consequently, courts have interpreted this section to
allow mergers through a long term lease, a sale, tenancies in
common, partnership, trust and joint tenants with rights of
survivorship.70 The new law demanded only that all "parties
in interest" (all parties with recordable interest who would be
adversely affected) be joined in a merger declaration in order
to gain the necessary approval permit from the Department of
Buildings." Furthermore, by requiring that all parties in in-
terest be joined, a plain reading of the definition of parties in
interest appears to allocate ownership of transferred air rights
to more than just the fee owner."1
1. Interpretations of "Parties in Interest"
Practitioners of zoning lot mergers believed that the
amendments to § 12-10 established conclusively who the "in-
terested parties" that had an interest in the transferred air
rights were.8 2 Ground lessees 3 or long-term lessee of an entire
77. New York, N.Y., Zoning Res. § 12-10 subd. (d), para. (iv) (1981) (emphasis
added).
78. Id. Subdivision (d) allows multiple fees to merge while subdivision (c) refers
to single fee ownership. See Frankel, Three-Dimensional Real Property Law: The
Truth about "Air Rights," 12 Real Est. L. J. 330 (1984).
79. 873 Third Ave. Corp. v. Kenvic Assoc., 190 N.Y.L.J. 3 at 6, col. 4 (N.Y. Sup.
Ct. July 6, 1983). This case was decided on the issue of the grandfather clause. But
this court notes a variety of methods to create a zoning lot merger including a long
term lease. It should be noted that the zoning lot merger may only merge the zoning
capacity of a parcel and does not always merge the fee titles.
80. Rifkin, supra note 29, at 17.
81. Id. at 18.
82. Id.
83. The ground lease is explained by one source as, "primarily an urban financ-
ing and investment vehicle that enables a lessor to convey land or air rights to a
lessee who undertakes to develop the property through new construction or substan-
tial improvements." Axelrod, infra note 107, at 981.
A lessee can lease a building and the lease may or may not cover the underlying
fee. This type of lease is similar to a common space lease but without the ground
1985]
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building were thought to be parties in interest. 4 In fact, the
Department of Buildings required these parties to be joined.8 5
Similarly, the mortgagee of a fee property and a mortgagee on
a lease were thought to be "parties in interest."86
Following the amendments to § 12-10 two developers,
Campeau Corp. and CFC Associates, sought to merge their re-
spectively owned lots located along a block at Third Avenue
between 52nd Street and 53rd Street at Lexington Avenue
with a contiguous lot owned by Cadillac Fairview, Inc.87 In
MacMillan v. Cadillac Fairview Corp. , the long term lessee of
a building occupying Cadillac's lot brought an action to enjoin
Cadillac from transferring the air rights over the lessee's
building to a contiguous lot owned by CFC Associates.18 The
lots, although merged into a single zoning lot, were in separate
fee ownership. The lessee, MacMillan Co., claimed they were a
party in interest to the transfer and had not been joined in
the September 30, 1981 declaration of zoning lot merger sub-
mitted to the Department of Buildings. 9 The main issue in
this action was whether the term "party in interest" used in
the zoning resolution applied to a long-term lessee of an entire
building.
The appellate division held that a long term lessee of an
entire building was a party in interest to the lot merger.90 The
court after examining the legislative history of the amended
zoning resolution determined that the function of the amend-
ment to the zoning lot definition in § 12-10 was to, "facilitate
air rights transfers in a manner which would not derrogate
lease provisions. A space lessee of a building ("building lessee") has little control over
the use of the grounds surrounding the building.
84. Rifkin, supra note 29, at 18-19.
85. Id. at 17.
86. Id. at 18. Rifkin believes that parties in interest may be defined as parties
with recordable interests under N.Y. Real Prop. Law § § 290(2) and 294(7) (McKin-
ney 1981).
87. MacMillan v. Cadillac Fairview Corp., 86 A.D.2d 15, 16-17, 448 N.Y.S.2d 668,
670 (1982), rev'd, MacMillan v. C.F. Lex Assoc., 56 N.Y.2d 386, 437 N.E.2d 1134,
1138, 452 N.Y.S.2d 377, 380 (1983).
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Id. at 20-21, 448 N.Y.S.2d at 669.
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from the rights of parties with certain defined substantial in-
terests in the real property affected. The purpose was to in-
volve and bind all such parties to the arrangement. . ." and:
Plaintiff's lease and its amendments were recorded
prior to the declaration in issue as required in article 1
(ch 2, § 12-10, "zoning lot", subd [d], par [iv], cl [XI) of
the resolution. It is equally clear that on the face of the
complaint sufficient is alleged to indicate that plaintiff is
"adversely affected by the Declaration" as required in
clause (Y) of paragraph (iv). 1
In addition to this determination the court attempted to
define the phrase, tract of land. The court concluded that al-
though a tract of land was not defined in the zoning resolu-
tion, it appeared to mean something more than merely the
plot of land on which a structure stands. "Tract of land"
should be deemed to include the space above the land includ-
ing buildings, the court explained.2
The appellate division was quickly reversed by the New
York Court of Appeals in MacMillan v. C.F. Lex Assoc.93 In
this decision the court of appeals focused its attention on the
zoning resolution's use of the phrase tract of land. The court
ruled that, 'tract of land' referred to the surface land only and
does not include buildings erected thereon.94 Accordingly,
even a very substantial tenant is not a party in interest to a
91. Id. at 19, 448 N.Y.S.2d at 669. In its analysis, the court examined the legisla-
tive purpose of the zoning resolution governing "commercial districts." This section
states that the purpose is to protect commerical development in central, major or
secondary commercial centers against congestion as far as possible by limiting the
bulk of buildings in the resolution in relation to the land around them. Consequently,
the court reasoned that a long term lessee of practically the entire building is surely
as affected by such a transfer as the ground lessee (courts have assumed that ground
lessees are parties in interest). Furthermore, the court determined that the resolu-
tion's purpose was to regulate the development processes' interference on light and
air, and the ensuing congestion on community services. Therefore, the court found
that a long term lessee held an enforceable recorded interest in all or part of the
"tract of land" to which the resolution applied. Id. at 18-19, 448 N.Y.S.2d at 669. See
New York, N.Y., Zoning Res. § 31-00(G) (1981).
92. Cadillac Fairview, 86 A.D.2d at 19-20, 448 N.Y.S.2d at 669-70.
93. C.F. Lex Assoc., 56 N.Y.2d at 386, 437 N.E.2d at 1138, 452 N.Y.S.2d at 381.
94. Id. at 391, 437 N.E.2d at 1140, 452 N.Y.S.2d at 383.
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Declaration of Zoning Lot Merger under the zoning resolu-
tion.95 Additionally, the court of appeals attempted to formu-
late its own definition of air rights. The court believed that air
rights were associated with the ownership of land rather than
with the ownership of the structures erected on the land." Air
rights, the court stated, are incidental to the ownership of the
surface property. Thus, the court quoted "cujus est
solum .... 97
Recently, the appellate division in Kenvic v. 873 Third
Ave. Assoc., ruled that a fee owner could transfer air rights
to an adjacent lot despite his ground lessee's objection. The
court gave two alternative reasons as a basis for its decision
that a ground lessee was not a party in interest because it was
95. The court based its conclusion on the plain meaning of the phrase "tract of
land." The word "tract," they noted, usually refers to "a region or stretch (as of land)
that is indefinitely described or without precise boundaries or a precisely defined or
defineable area of land (Webster's Third New International)." Id. Futhermore, the
court noted the word "land" means, "The solid part of the surface of the earth in
contrast to the water of the oceans and seas." Id. at 392, 437 N.E.2d at 1140, 452
N.Y.S.2d at 383. Subsequently, the court stated, neither alone nor in combination do
these words in their lexigraphic sense connote buildings or improvements ... and it
would be a strained interpretation to include buildings and structures." Id.
Also, the courts differed in their interpretation of the legislative purpose behind
the zoning resolution. The court of appeals cited a completely different general pur-
pose clause than the lower court by quoting § 31-00 subd. (k) which stated the pur-
pose of the resolution was to, "promote the most desirable use of land and direction
of building development in accord with a well considered plan, to promote stability of
commercial development, to strengthen the economic base of the City." Id.
96. Id.
97. "[T]o whomsoever the soil belongs, he owns also to the sky and to the
depths .. " Id.
The court rejected plaintiff's argument that air rights owe their origin to New
York Zoning Resolution. The court, instead, interpreted the zoning resolution as a
"sophisticated procedure to facilitate the functional transfer of air rights. In doing so
it treats property rights long antedating the enactment of the resolution." Id. at 393
n.3, 437 N.E.2d at 1140 n.3, 452 N.Y.S.2d at 383 n.3. This definition is not an ac-
cepted definition of air rights for it fails to identify which property rights the court is
referring to.
Evidently, the court's analysis was diametrically opposed to the appellate divi-
sion. Whereas the appellate division recognized a difference in the degree of a right to
possess air right between a long term lessee of an entire building and an ordinary
space tenant, the court of appeals refused to differentiate between these two different
tenancies.
98. Kenvic Assoc., 109 A.D.2d at 489, 494 N.Y.S.2d at 727.
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disputed as to whether or not the lessee qualified for treat-
ment under a grandfathering provision in the old § 12-10.91
The court for its first reason denied the lessee ownership of
air rights under the old § 12-10 because his lease did not run
for the required 75 years or more duration.100 For its second
alternative reason the court interpreted the C.F. Lex Assoc.
decision to hold that a ground lessee was not a party in inter-
est under the new amended § 12-10, and the court held
accordingly.101
The Kenvic analysis is incorrect. The C.F. Lex Assoc. de-
cision did not factually deal with a ground lease. Rather, the
MacMillan Company in that case was merely a space tenant
of the building from the second floor up.'0 2 Furthermore, the
appellate division failed to recognize that the court of appeals
stated, in C.F. Lex Assoc., that a party in interest must be
someone who had an interest in the tract of land itself.103
Since the ground lessee in Kenvic had the right to possession
of the land and the right to add additional improvements and
floor area for the duration of his lease, it would be correct to
say that he had such an adversely affected interest in the land
itself and, therefore, fulfilled the court of appeal's require-
ment for a party in interest.
A court has similarly rejected the contention that a mort-
gagee is a party in interest. In Schleifer v. M. W. Realty Assoc.
the plaintiff, the holder of a first mortgage on the lot of 797
Third Avenue and 201-207 East 49th Street, brought an ac-
tion for waste when the fee owner of a two story restaurant,
the defendant, attempted a zoning lot merger with a contigu-
ous lot.10 4 The court reasoned that an action for impairment
of security of the mortgage, or waste, may be brought when a
mortgagor impairs the value of the mortgagee's security
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Id. at 495-99, 494 N.Y.S.2d at 729-30. (Asch, J., dissenting in part).
102. C.F. Lex Assoc., 56 N.Y.2d at 389, 437 N.E.2d at 1136, 452 N.Y.S.2d at 379.
103. Id.
104. Schleifer v. M.W. Realty Assoc., 186 N.Y.L.J. 27, at 6 col. 1 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
August 7, 1981).
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lien.106 The court noted that an action for waste is for physical
damage to the premises and the transfer of air rights does not
constitute physical damage, but rather a "transfer of real
property" subject to the mortgagee's first lien.10 6 The court
explained that there had been no impairment of the plaintiff's
security since his mortgage remains a prior first lien on the
mortgagee's premises and the transferred floor area. 10 7
In this decision the court was relying on a precarious as-
sumption. The assumption was that the transfer of air rights
was in fact a transfer of real property. 08 New York real prop-
erty law does not define transferred air rights as real prop-
erty.10 Moreover, real property is transacted from one party
to another by "conveying" the property by a deed or a will,
not by "transferring" parcels from one location to the next. 10
105. Id.
106. Id. The court here does not explain how real property in the form of air
rights is transferred.
107. Id. at col. 2. The court relied on the fact that there was no specific clause in
the mortgage calling for acceleration of the outstanding principle or enforcement of
the lien interest on the property. It is quite probable that a due on sale clause would
cover air rights. See infra notes 140-51 and accompanying text. Furthermore, since
most due on sale clauses did not become popular until the inflationary 1970's, they
would most likely not cover the concept of air rights. See Axelrod, Land Transfer and
Finance 121 (2d ed. Supp. 1984). See also Wellenkamp v. Bank of America, 21 Cal. 3d
.943, 582 P.2d 970, 148 Cal. Rptr. 379 (1978) upholding due on sale provisions as not
being a restraint on alienation.
Additionally, although the court granted the mortgagee a first security lien on
the transferred FAR, it did not discuss a remedy for the mortgagee in case of default.
For example, one glaring issue that the court failed to address was whether the trans-
feree lot, the second mortgagee of the air rights, would have the right to partially
redeem the FAR affixed to the building, or whether he would have to redeem by
purchasing both lots. See Springer Corp. v. Kirkeby-Natus, 80 N.M. 206, 453 P.2d
376 (1969).
108. If it was not a transfer of real property, the mortgagee's only alternative was
to bring an action for waste, which he did. See Warren's Weed, N.Y. Law Real Prop.,
Waste § 1.01 (4th ed. 1983).
109. See infra notes 181-85 and accompanying text.
110. A conveyance is an intervivos transfer of title to or interest in real property
from a living person or from a legal entity to another. In re Loes' Will, 55 N.Y.S.2d
723, 726 (1945). Conveyance is defined by N.Y. statute as, "including every instru-
ment, in writing, except a will, by which any estate or interest in real property is
created, transferred, assigned or surrendered." N.Y. Real Prop. Law § 240(2) (McKin-
ney 1964).
A transfer of air rights from one parcel to another depicts a transfer of the prop-
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In fact, there is no commonly held legal definition of what an
air right or a transferred air right represents. 1 '
2. Parties in Interest: An Alternative Interpretation.
The lack of a commonly accepted definition of trans-
ferred air rights as well as its recent evolution in the real es-
tate community relative to the length of certain leases," 2 has
caused and will probably continue to cause a certain degree of
inequity in the judiciary's allocation of these transferred
rights. The court of appeals in Newport Assoc. and the appel-
late division in Cadillac Fairview concluded that the statutory
authority denied the fee owner exclusive" 3 rights to the trans-
ferred air rights. These courts avoided the strained interpreta-
tions which could conceivably have used the lease itself to al-
locate air rights." 4 Instead, these courts chose to rely on a
new definition of ownership, a form of beneficial ownership,"'
erty as opposed to the transfer of an instrument representing the conveyance of a real
property. Real property is defined as, "[1]and, and generally whatever is erected or
growing upon or affixed to land. . . . In respect to property, real and personal corre-
spond very nearly with immovables and movables of the civil law." Black's Law Dic-
tionary 1383 (14th ed. 1964) (emphasis in original).
Furthermore, New York statute defines real property as, "coextensive in meaning
with lands, tenements and hereditaments." N.Y. Real Prop. Law § 210 (McKinney
1968).
111. The court in C.F. Lex Assoc. defines tiansferred air rights as long associated
with property rights, but the court refers to no authority. See supra note 95-97 and
accompanying text.
112. Axelrod, supra note 107, at 981. The author notes that the common length
for ground leases is usually 21 years or more.
113. Exclusivity is defined as the right to exclude others who might want to take
part of the property. Hirsch, Law and Economic Analysis, at 19 (1979).
114. This may be attributable to the fact that most ground leases and long term
building leases ran for a period of 30 years or more. The zoning resolution governing
air rights was first employed in the early 1960's leaving many leases without provi-
sions governing air rights. In light of this problem, the drafters of the original zoning
lot merger may have purposefully defined ownership of air rights as a lease totalling
75 years or more. See supra note 21 and accompanying text; Marcus, supra note 6, at
372-74; but see Frankel, supra note 78, at 330-35 where the author believes the term
of the lease should control. Possibly the definition of floor area may be inserted into
the lease. Also, if a term in a lease could conceivably constitute a waiver, it would
have to be put into a form acceptable to the zoning resolution. The landlord may
have to compel his tenant in some way to sign such a waiver.
115. In order to conform to the contemporary realities of urban development,
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conferred upon parties with adversely affected recordable in-
terests defined in the zoning resolution as parties in inter-
est.11 Thus, an enforceably recorded interest under these
courts' analysis must refer to the parties with some ownership
interest in the air rights such as a building lessee (a space ten-
ant of the majority of the building), a ground lessee,117 or a
building lessee with the option or the possibility of adding ad-
ditional floor space,"l " and the value of whose ownership right
land-use law should redefine exactly what is meant by ownership of real property.
Modern urban engineering capabilities combined with certain tax advantages dimin-
ish the importance of fee ownership of property. Equity as well as the authority dele-
gated to the city to zone for the general welfare demands the protection of parties
with other than fee interests. See supra note 42 and accompanying text. For example,
one person may own a building but only lease the land or the supports upon which it
rests. Conversely, one person may develop a property and later sell it for tax pur-
poses, while taking back a lease for 75 years or more.
The origional zoning lot merger defined ownership for the purposes of air rights
as a lease for 75 years or more. See supra note 24 and accopmanying text. See also
Mark, Leasehold Mortgages - Some Practical Considerations, 14 Bus. Law. 609
(1959), where the author notes that in Baltimore, Maryland and other jurisdictions a
ground lease is considered the equivalent of a fee estate. Id. at 609.
Land is not a depreciable asset. Therefore, developers often lease the land and
build improvements, buildings, which are depreciable. The developer deducts his land
rents as well as depreciating his buildings, thus effectively increasing his cash flow.
See Axelrod, supra note 107, at 991, and see I.R.C. § 178 (1984) which governs the
depreciation or amortization of lessee owned improvements on leased land.
For purposes of financing and tax advantages such as ACRS (accelerated cost
recovery depreciation formulae) many corporations have developed properties, ex-
hausted the accelerated tax benefits, and then sold the building taking back long
term leases in exchange. See Axelrod, supra note 107 (Supp. 1984) at 991; Frank
Lyon Company v. United States, 435 U.S. 561 (1978); Cary, Corporate Financing
Through the Sale and Lease-Back of Property: Business, Tax and Policy Considera-
tions, 62 Harv. L. Rev. 1 (1948).
116. See supra note 77.
117. Cadillac Fairview, 86 A.D.2d at 18, 448 N.Y.S.2d at 670. This decision was
reversed on the issue of a building leasee being a party in interest in C.F. Lex Assoc.,
56 N.Y.2d at 393, 437 N.E.2d at 1138, 452 N.Y.S.2d at 381. However, the court's
reversal may be seen as a reinstatement of the New York State Supreme Court's
decision that a ground lessee was a party in interest. Furthermore, under the court of
appeals decision the ground lessee would have an interest in the tract of land. Id. But
see Kenvic Assoc., 109 A.D.2d at 492, 494 N.Y.S.2d at 726, which recently held that a
ground lessee with a long term lease and the right to build additional improvements
was not a party in interest for the purposes of air rights.
118. New York, N.Y., Zoning Res. § 12-10 (1981). Frankel believes adversely af-
fected parties are those parties whose lease terms are adversely affected by a zoning
lot merger. Frankel believes the term adversely affected interest of § 12-10 subd. (d),
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would be undermined by the effects of a transfer.119
For example, no court could rule that a lessee of Grand
Central Station would not be adversely affected by an air
rights conveyance project built over his roof.120 Such a project
would have an adverse impact on the lessee's right to ingress
and egress, 12 his light-air access rights,'2 2 and his right to
quiet enjoyment of the premises. 2 3 Moreover, according to
these courts' plain reading of § 12-10, it is not essential that a
building lessee or a ground lessee be used as a means of sup-
port. If a lessor "transfers," without his tenant's consent, the
air rights to a contiguous parcel, the lessor is interfering with
his tenant's light-air access rights and ingress and egress
rights."' These factors will ultimately decrease the value of
par. (iv), cl. (Y) modifies enforceable recorded interest such as a building lessee or a
ground lessee and not just any holder of a recorded interest. Frankel, supra note 78.
But see supra note 117. Also, it would be difficult to imagine which implicit or ex-
plicit term in a lease would cover transferred air rights since there is no accepted
legal definition.
119. Cadillac Fairview, 86 A.D.2d 15-17, 448 N.Y.S.2d at 670. Prospective lien
holders such as mortgagees and option holders are covered under § 12-10 subd.(d),
par. (iv), cl. (X); building lessees are covered under cl. (Y). The law of equitable servi-
tudes and negative reciprocal servitudes is covered by cl. (Z).
120. For problems with air rights projects where the owner seeks to add addi-
tional floors see Hinds, Upper East Side Institutions Fear Downzoning, N.Y. Times,
June 6, 1985, § 8 (real estate), at 1. Also, for examples of entire buildings being
carved out of air space, see Morris, infra note 142, at 268. In one example, the U.N.
Plaza, the bottom supporting structure was built and was later surmounted by two
towers over a time period reflecting market values in the area. Warren, supra note 50.
121. These words express the right of the tenant to enter upon and return from
the lands in question. Blacks Law Dictionary 921 (4th ed. 1968).
122. See infra note 124.
123. Quiet enjoyment refers to a covenant usually inserted in a lease or convey-
ance on the part of the grantor promising that the tenant or grantee shall enjoy the
possession of the premises in peace without disturbance. Black's Law Dictionary 1416
(4th ed. 1968).
124. Light and air easements are the so-called negative easements which have
generally been avoided by the courts in this country unless specifically agreed to by
the parties. See Warren's Weed, New York L. Real Prop., Easement § 1.01 (4th ed.
1983); see also Irving Trust v. Amahma Realty, 285 N.Y. 416, 35 N.E.2d 21 (1941);
Stanley Harte v. Empire State Building, 30 Misc. 2d 665, 219 N.Y.S.2d 566 (Sup. Ct.
1961). This latter case noted the complications of enforcing negative easement.
These cases illustrate that a covenant against a landlord's interference with his
lessee's light and air will not be implied unless the parties so intended.
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the leasehold. 25 The tenant's leasehold is as adversely af-
fected by an air rights transfer as it would be if his landlord
conveyed the air rights for a twenty story building to be er-
ected on top of the leasehold.126 For this reason, the earlier
courts interpreted that the statute did not distinguish be-
tween a ground lessee who had the right to the tract of land
and the air space above it and a lessee of an entire building
whose leasehold would be adversely affected. 127
In Cadillac Fairview the appellate division recognized the
long term building lessee's qualified ownership of air rights
when it stated:
A long-term lessee of practically an entire building is
surely as affected by such a transfer as a ground lessee.
The interference with light and air and the ensuing con-
gestion and effect on community services and other conse-
quences plainly impact on each in a similar manner. (Em-
phasis supplied.)2 s
Evidently, this obligation not to adversely affect inter-
ested parties without first obtaining their consent is what the
zoning resolution attempted to establish. 2 " An adversely af-
fected party becomes important in a vertical subdivision be-
125. The market value here would be determined by the value of a hypothetical
sublease, if the lessee has such rights.
126. The law of equity has a few examples of restricting intensive development
which may effect owners or lessees such as privity of estate, negative reciprocal servi-
tudes, and equitable servitudes. Cf. Snow v. Van Dam, 291 Mass. 477, 197 N.E. 224
(1935); Sanborn v. McLean, 233 Mich. 227, 206 N.W. 496 (1925) (where equitable
servitudes were created by implication); Bristol v. Woodward, 251 N.Y. 275, 288
(1929); Tulk v. Moxhay, 2 Phillips 774, 41 Eng. Rep. 1143 (1848); New York, N.Y.,
Zoning Res. § 12-10 subd. (d), par. (iv), cl. (z) (1981). The aforementioned discuss
how equitable servitudes may be created by implication and benefit third parties.
See generally Note, Restrictive Covenants in Shopping Center Leases, 34
N.Y.U.L. Rev. 940, 943 (1959) where the author discusses how negative servitudes
have been developed by courts of equity to benefit a lessee from competition by his
landlord on lessor's other property, where the burden of an affirmative restrictive
covenant does not touch and concern the other property so restricted by the cove-
nant. These are referred to as anti-competition clauses.
127. Cadillac Fairview, 86 A.D.2d at 15-17, 448 N.Y.S.2d at 669-70.
128. Id.
129. Id.
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cause a zoning lot merger gives a developer an "as of right"
right to develop additional FAR and to consequently affect
other owners. The consent requirement of § 12-10 would allow
affected parties; ground lessee, building lessee,130 fee owners,
and mortgagees to join in an agreement that would regulate
development in a manner which would have the least adverse
affect on other owners in the vertical subdivision. 3" Such an
agreement could also provide for ameliorating the develop-
ment's affect on the surrounding community and conse-
quently promote the general welfare as opposed to the welfare
of a select body of developers.3 2
The statute in this interpretation would create a proper
balance between the rights of the fee owners and the other
adversely affected parties by giving this latter group a certain
amount of bargaining power. This bargaining power may not
be sufficient to terminate development, but at least should be
enough for the interested parties to have some input in the
overall development plan."3s In this manner, the zoning reso-
lution can be seen as a way of allowing private parties to cre-
ate their own vertically scaled subdivision plan within the
zoning lot, as well as a way for them to allocate an equitable
distribution of transferable air rights. 3 4
130. A building lessee refers to a space tenant of the entire building without a
ground lease.
131. Cadillac Fairview, 86 A.D.2d at 15, 448 N.Y.S.2d at 669; see also supra note
42 and accompanying text. Covenant and servitudes as architectual land-use controls
are similar to anti-competition clauses and have been upheld by courts in other
states. See Caullet v. Stilwell, 67 N.J. Super. 111, 170 A.2d 52 (1961); M. Urban,
Urban Evaluation of the Applicable Zoning Principles to the Law of Private Land-
use Restrictions, 21 UCLA L. Rev. 1655 (1974).
132. See supra note 42 and accompanying text. See also infra note 134 and ac-
companying text.
133. For example one authority notes that the court of appeals found that the
design of the building adjacent to the MacMillan building was constructed in a way
that minimized the structure's effect on the light and air and overall view of the
MacMillan building. Frankel, supra note 78, at 343. So any challenge to the transfer
under this interpretation may have had the same result.
134. Subdivision is defined as, "any tract of land which is hereafter divided into
five or more parcels along an existing or proposed street, highway, easement or right-
of-way for sale or for rent as residential lots or residential building plots. An-
derson, supra note 31, § 15.02 at 667.
Subdivision controls are meant to direct development under the comprehensive
1985]
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IV. Defining a Transferable Development Right: A Guide
for Legislative Reform
One remarkable aspect of the zoning lot merger is that it
appears to delegate to private parties the power to negotiate
the zoning capacity of a development project, a power previ-
ously reserved only to the government. 35 The courts and
some legal authorities have assigned the terms air rights,
transferred air rights, transferable development rights and
others to describe the legal interest negotiated in a zoning lot
merger. The statute itself does not use any of these terms,
rather it uses such terms as zoning lots, tract of land, parties
in interest and FAR levels.'3" The misuse of these terms may
contribute to the confusion.
The present case law, however, adheres to at least two
distinct views of transferred air rights without ever defining
the term. The first view as enunciated by the court in Mac-
Millan v. C.F. Lex Assoc. and MacMillian v. Cadillac
Fairview, defines air rights to the extent that what is trans-
ferred is an interest in real property.1 37 For example, one
court states that the zoning resolution is merely "sophisti-
cated procedures to facilitate the functional transfer of air
rights. In so doing it treats of [sic] property rights long ante-
dating the enactment of the [zoning] resolution. '" '1 3 The sec-
ond viewpoint is described by the court in Newport Assoc. v.
plan at the lot level. They are designed to promote economic development and re-
quire the developer to install and pay for basic improvements. Id. Although New
York's highrise developments are similar to a vertical form of the subdivision, they
are not classified as a subdivision. One New York case holds that condominium is not
a subdivision of land under the General Municipal Law. See Gerber v. Clarkstown, 70
Misc. 2d 220, 356 N.Y.S.2d 926 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1979).
Compare supra note 4. These regulations allow city planners to regulate ingress,
egress, congestion levels, building materials, common areas and the like in return for
additional FAR; see also N.Y. Real Prop. Law § 339 (McKinney Supp. 1984). The
Common Interest Ownership Act has similar attributes to subdivision regulations.
135. The delegated power to zone is in the state enabling act. See supra note 42.
136. New York, N.Y., Zoning Res. § 12-10 at 48 (1981).
137. See MacMillan v. Cadillac Fairview, 86 A.D.2d 15, 17, 448 N.Y.S.2d at 668,
670 (1982), rev'd, MacMillan v C.F. Lex Assoc., 56 N.Y.2d 386, 389, 437 N.E.2d 1134,
1136, 452 N.Y.S.2d 377, 379 (1983); see infra note 149-51 and accompanying text.
138. C.F. Lex Assoc., 56 N.Y.2d at 393 n.3, 437 N.E.2d at 1138 n.3, 452 N.Y.S.2d
at 381 n.3.
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Solow. This latter viewpoint states that transferred air rights
are merely a creation of an ordinance that permits the owner
of the air rights (as opposed to the fee owner) to merge his
zoning capacity (FAR) with the zoning capacity of an adjacent
lot owner and declare unity of zoning capacity ownership
while the underlying fees themselves remain in separate
ownership.' 39
A. The Fallacy of a Transferable Air Right
The term "air rights" is a recent phenomenon of jurispru-
dence and at times it has been misused. 40 Air rights may be
traced to modern urban congestion which places a financial
premium on height and bulk."" The right to build upwards in
various forms of ownership have consequently become of great
importance to real property law. A basis for legally defining
vertical ownership such as a condominium is the theory of air
rights. 42 Air rights are defined as an independent unit of real
property created through the horizontal subdivision of real es-
tate and it describes the right to occupy that space above a
"specified plane over, on, or beneath a designated tract of
land."" 3 Air itself is not real property and is not conveyed;
however, air rights are real property when described in the
three dimensions with reference to a specific locus."'
At common law air rights were determined according to
the ancient maxim, "cujus est solum," where air rights were
thought to be one part of a bundle of rights included in the
139. Newport Assoc. v. Solow, 30 N.Y.2d 263, 268, 283 N.E.2d 600, 602, 332
N.Y.S.2d 617, 620, (1972), cert. denied, 410 U.S. 931 (1973).
140. See Frankel, supra note 78, at 340.
141. See Comment, Conveyance and Taxation of Air Rights, 64 Colum. L. Rev.
338 (1964).
142. See Morris, Air Rights are Fertile Soil, 1 Urb. Law. 247, 248-49 (1964).
143. Comment, supra note 141, at 338.
144. Id. For example of specific locus we have such definitive descriptions as tax
lots, lot and block descriptions and metes and bounds descriptions. See N.Y. Real
Prop. Law. § 240 (McKinney 1964). Case law envisions deed description in the two
and three dimensional realms. See generally Fletcher v. Flake, 97 A.D.2d 623, 468
N.Y.S.2d 938 (1983); Hibiscus Harbor v. Ebersol, 63 A.D.2d 824, 406 N.Y.S.2d 182
(1978).
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ownership of land. 14 5 This "appurtenant theory" holds that
air rights are appurtenant to the ownership of the soil, and
the surface owner may exercise these rights in full enjoyment
of his land. Presently, a controversial theory has arisen which
distinguishes air rights from land rights. 1 4 The latter contro-
versial theory, the "homogeneous space theory," holds that air
space itself is owned just like the soil, and that a title in fee
consists of a three dimensional homogeneous space, part of it
filled with soil and the remainder air space.14 7 Thus, in the
homogeneous space theory, land is measured in a two dimen-
sional "metes and bounds description" for convenience and is
essential only for locating the horizontal stratification of own-
ership of real estate. 148
Not coincidentally, the appurtenant theory is the basis
for the court of appeals overturning the appellate division in
C.F. Lex Assoc. The court, in that case, looked at the phrase
"tract of land" and noted that air rights
have historically been conceived as one of the bundle of
rights associated with the ownership of land rather than
with the ownership of the structure erected on the land.
Air rights are incidental to the ownership of the surface
property - the right of one who owns land to utilize the
space above it.14'
Therefore, ownership of air rights according to the theory
means title ownership or an interest in the land.1 50
145. See Morris, supra note 142.
146. Id. at 250.
147. Id.
148. Id.
149. C.F. Lex Assoc., 56 N.Y.2d at 392, 437 N.E.2d at 1138, 452 N.Y.S.2d at 381.
150. Although the court of appeals relies heavily on the appurtenant theory, by
acknowledging that air rights may be transferred the court has taken the theory be-
yond its own limitations. The appurtenant theory employs the concept of air rights
only so long as they remain attached to a specific fee. Furthermore one authority
stated:
Much as one cannot transfer the year warranty that comes with a new car
unless one transfer the car as well, the property owner may not transfer his
light-air access rights without the land to which the rights are appurte-
nant. . .the right to occupy air space does not run with air space; it runs with
[Vol. 3
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The appellate division, on the other hand, implied a ho-
mogeneous air rights theory into the zoning resolution when it
interprets "tract of land" to "mean more than merely the plot
of land on which the structure stands . . . . 'tract of land'
should be deemed to include the space above the land, partic-
ularly the buildings on the land." 15'
There are, however, physical limitations to these theories
as well. The air rights, whether thought of as appurtenant or
homogeneous, remain affixed to its locus point which is a
metes and bounds, longitude-latitude deed description of the
property below. 152 These theories which describe a conveyance
of real property could hardly be applied to a physical transfer
of air rights. Without affixing a two dimensional reference
point it would be impossible to locate at a given point in time
the boundary of the property, and subsequently the legal rela-
tions between subjacent owner, the land owner and the super-
adjacent owner would be indeterminable, without a four di-
mensional deed.153
In summary, neither the homogeneous theory which uses
the fee owner's tract as a locus for the three dimensional sub-
and is inseparable from ownership of the land ...
Morris, supra note 142, at 252.
Note under this definition condominium owners defined by the "common interest
ownership act" would be parties in interest since their ownership is appurtenant to
the land. See N.Y. Real Prop. Law § 339(e)(5) (McKinney Supp. 1984).
151. Cadillac Fairview, 86 A.D. 2d at 19-20, 448 N.Y.S.2d at 669. Legislative rec-
ognition of fee ownership in air rights has resulted in such air right developments as
the Washbridge Apartments which rest upon Interstate 95. Additionally, the Pan
American building (this building in fact is built over Grand Central Station), Park
Avenue and Madison Square Garden are all examples of buildings, under separate air
rights ownership, which are separate structures, independent from the land and sub-
surface structure upon which they rest; however, in order for these projects to work,
the developer must exact a support system from the supporting structure below. Real
property law has provided a bundle of devices such as "fee support columns," support
easements and lease-sublease back schemes in order to define the support rights of
the individual owners. See Comment, supra note 141, at 346-50; Morris, supra note
142, at 261-64.
152. Therefore, the transfer of air space rights from parcel to parcel would be the
equivalent of transferring air space on top of already existing air space. See N.Y.
Times, Feb. 21, 1986, § D at 1, col. 3.
153. Subjacent owner refers to the three dimensional owner below a specified
horizonal plane and superadjacent owner refers to the owner above that plane. See
Morris, supra note 142, at 260.
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division, nor the appurtenant theory, which attaches owner-
ship of air and structures over the land to the fee itself, recog-
nize the ability to transfer three dimensional air space from
one fee to another fee.'0 These theories describe a conveyance
of air rights and not a transfer of fee air rights. 155 Perhaps
these aforementioned cases would have made more sense if
the courts employed a two step analysis. The first step of this
analysis is that a party in interest is an owner of transferable
floor area. The second step calls on the court to determine
who is a party in interest by choosing a theory of air rights
and then determining if that party is adversely affected or
not. 
16
This analysis, however, is convoluted. It requires a two
step analysis and the result depends on an ambiguous choice
between two theoretical views of real property. In order to fa-
cilitate this transaction and obtain greater certainty for devel-
opers as well as predictability in judicial interpretations it is
desirous to describe the transferred interest itself. This inter-
est which has been referred to for the most part as a transfer
of air rights will hereinafter be referred to as a transfer of de-
velopment rights (TDR).157
B. Dimensional Zoning and Transferable Development
Rights
Recently, legal authorities have turned to "dimensional
154. See supra note 110 and accompanying text.
155. A description transferring the location of an interest in real property would
have to describe the property not only in a'three dimensional form as in an air rights
conveyance, but would also have to add the element of time. N.Y. Real Prop. Law. §
240 (McKinney Supp. 1985) does not cover this type of description nor does N.Y.
Real Property Law discuss the rights if a builder defaults or the property is rezoned
before rights vest. See Kuntz & Opar, supra note 31, at col. 1.
156. According to the court of appeals' appurtenant theory a person with an in-
terest in the land itself is the most crucial factor in owning the transferable floor area
(development rights). See C.F. Lex Assoc., 56 N.Y.2d at 392-93, 437 N.E.2d at 1138,
452 N.Y.S.2d at 381. The appellate division, on the other hand, would argue that a
party in interest will be determined in accordance with the three dimensional homog-
enous view of real property. See Cadillac Fairview, 86 A.D.2d at 20, 448 N.Y.S.2d at
669.
157. See infra note 161 and accompanying text.
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zoning" in order to describe a legal foundation for the actual
transfer of development rights. The concept behind dimen-
sional zoning is that there is a new form of urban land use
regulation which is described in terms of space and time.158
Time zoning is defined to mean the establishment of a timeta-
ble for the orderly development of a specified area.1 59 Space
zoning deals with the technique of transferring zoning or in
other words development rights from one site to another, usu-
ally in densely occupied urban areas. Space zoning occurs
when, "the transferor site (having a building underutilizing its
maximum zoning potential) conveys to the transferee site (one
in the process of development), all or portion of its unused
potential zoning capacity, which would otherwise lie
fallow."'- 0
The zoning lot merger is in reality a TDR.'8 ' TDR is a
concept of developing space over time. The space or FAR
rights are transferred to a contiguous receiving lot and are not
fully utilized until the time sequence, the building process, is
complete. 62
1. Is a Transfer Development Right an Interest in Real
Property.
The concept underlying TDRs assumes that title to real
property is not a unitary or monolithic right, but rather part
158. Morris, Dimensional Zoning, 46 St. John's L. Rev. 679 (1977).
159. Id. at 680
160. Id. at 679. Space zoning is defined to mean the transference of air rights
from one parcel to another.
161. Costonis, The Chicago Plan: Incentive Zoning and the Preservation of Ur-
ban Landmarks, 85 Harv. L. Rev. 574, 592 n. 58 (1972); Alan, supra note 1, at 338
n.4. Where the author states:
However, the technique does not entail transfer of "air rights"..The lat-
ter are a property interest in a three dimensional location in space. Develop-
ment rights, on the other hand, are simply a government license to build a
defined amount of floor area as measured by the amount of lot area that has
been constructively transferred to the project site.
162. This process may take years. See Morris, supra note 158, at 680-81. See
generally Golden v. Planning Bd. Town of Ramapo, 30 N.Y.2d 359, 334 N.Y.S.2d 138,
appeal dismissed 409 U.S. 1003 (1972). Here a town in upstate New York required
developers to complete public infrastructure improvements over a period of years in
order to gain permission to develop.
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of a bundle of rights, each of which may be separated and
transferred to another parcel, leaving the original owner with
all other rights of ownership. One of these component rights is
the right to develop.1 8 Some authorities believe that there are
legal precedents for TDRs.6 4 One authority notes that, "we
have long been accustomed to the separation and alienability
of such components of title as mineral rights and mortgage
liens. . . ."16 Still others cite examples such as the Milldam
Acts, which enabled downstream owners to construct dams
and harness water power so long as upstream owners were
compensated for their lost rights to develop.166 These authori-
ties also look to the "Town and Country Planning Act" of
1947 which nationalized all land development in Great
Britain. 167
It must be noted that in none of these so-called legal
precedents were development rights actually transferred from
the land. Rather, these examples represent police power regu-
lating the right to develop land on privately owned parcels.
The right to develop in these cases did not leave the land,
rather they were merely held dormant.168
Instead, the origin of TDRs is found in the planning and
zoning resolutions of New York City.169 TDR's existence is
owed to the zoning regulation for floor area which is a method
of regulating population density.17 0 Therefore, TDR is a trans-
fer of permissible density levels. As illustrated, the TDR is
merely a contrivance, a political compromise, that is in need
of a legal classification.
163. Merriam, Making TDR Work, 56 N. Car. L. Rev. 77, 85-89 (1977); Rose,
The Transfer of Development Rights: A Preview of an Evolving Concept, 3 Real Est.
L.J. 330, 331-37 (1975).
164. Merriam, supra note 163, at 85.
165. Rose, supra note 163, at 331.
166. Id. at 333-37.
167. Merriam, supra note 163, at 88-89.
168. These descriptions note that real property is theoretically a bundle of sticks,
but in none of the aforementioned examples does the stick leave the fee. Rose, supra,
note 163, at 331.
169. New York, N.Y., Zoning Res. § 12-10 at 48-49 (1981); Pedowitz, infra note
174, at 198.
170. See supra notes 14-25 and accompanying text.
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A TDR most likely represents an interest in real property
that is less than a fee simple interest.'' Some authorities have
termed the TDR as an irrevocable license or a lease in real
property. 172 These definitions are extremely unpalatable. Li-
censes, unlike easements, do not run with the land.' 78 A li-
cense in real property is personal to the owner of the land and
is assignable only if so intended by the parties. '7  A mortgagee
who forecloses on his security lien, for example, would not be
bound by the prior owner's license. The most likely explana-
tion of the interest represented by TDRs is that it remains a
conveyance of an interest in real property resembling a nega-
tive easement.17 5 Moreover, a zoning lot merger may be seen
as a statutory form of negative easements, and it has a similar
effect. l7 e Support for this theory may be found in the zoning
171. Costonis, supra note 161. See also supra note 152-56 and accompanying
text.
172. Warren's Weed, supra note 50, at 120-21.
173. Warren's Weed, N.Y. Law Real Prop. License, § 1.03 at 2 (4th Ed. 1973).
174. Id. Likewise a TDR may also be classified as a lease. A lease on the other
hand, confers upon a lessee exclusive possession of some definite space against the
owner of property. Id. In fact, from 1969 to 1977 it was represented by a lease. If a
TDR is a lease the legislator or the courts must discuss what occurs in the event of
default or on the expiration of a lease.
Section 12-10 originally described air rights as a lease for 75 years or more. See
supra note 24 and accompanying text.
As in all property problems which confer less than fee interest, there is a problem
of fashioning a remedy upon expiration of an interest. For example, will the rever-
sionary interest become a nonconforming use? Pedowitz, Air and Development
Rights, 9 Real Prop. & Prob. J. 183, 198 (1974). See Kuntz & Opar, supra note 31, at
33. This problem is not addressed by the statute. However New York, N.Y., Zoning
Res. § 54-00 (1982) provides a certain number of years amortization for non-con-
forming uses. Also, there is an issue concerning what happens on default by the
lessee. Can the lessee be ordered to tear down floors representing the transferred
FAR space? The answer to the latter question is probably no. See generally, In re
Robert Pace, 93 Misc. 2d 969, 400 N.Y.S.2d 488 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1977). The useless
destruction of property would be seen as void by public policy. But perhaps the lessor
or mortgagor can have a court impose a constructive trust on the transferee ac-
counted for by the proceeds of the additional rentable floor area. Kuntz & Opar,
supra note 31.
175. Some authorities hold TDR's are negative easements. See Pedowitz, supra
note 174, at 197; Rifkin, supra note 29, at 22.
176. Morris, supra note 142, at 252. Here the author notes that air rights are
part of the same class of real property as light-air access rights and they are part of
the package included in the ownership of land surface. Under this theory air rights
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resolution itself. 177 For example, the stated legislative purpose
of bulk (height and setback) and FAR zoning is to regulate
the overall congestion and light and air in New York City.178
Additionally, the TDR as practiced in New York is founded
on the zoning ordinance which determined that a parcel of
property is entitled to a certain amount of density designated
as floor area.179 The power to allocate a lattice work of the
density levels may be deemed given to the parties in interest
upon the formation of the original zoning lot. By transferring
or purchasing the available rights to certain FAR levels, the
transferor would not be transferring air rights, but would be
instead conveying or releasing the "transferee" from a statuto-
rily prescribed negative easement consisting of light-air access
rights and density-congestion rights.180
An easement definition, however, raises certain problems.
For example, there remains the issue of whether the easement
would in fact survive a lot merger, because easements are said
to be extinguished upon unity of ownership and the zoning lot
merger does merge ownership of the allowable density
levels. 81 Another problem with an easement theory is that if
the easement so impairs the mortgagee's lien, the transferor's
mortgagee may accelerate his mortgage due to the alienation
of part of his collateral.182
and transferred air rights would be one and the same, however it should be noted
that it is possible to convey air rights through a three dimensional deed without con-
veying floor area, thus conveying an empty shell. It is more practical, therefore, to
think of an air right conveyance as a three dimensional deed conveyance, while refer-
ing to transferred air rights as a conveyance of a density easement to adjacent lot
owners (the latter would of course indirectly affect light-air access rights).
177. See supra note 8.
178. New York, N.Y., Zoning Res. § 31-00(G), at 195 (1981).
179. See supra note 14 and accompanying text.
180. Cf. N.Y. Envtl. Conserv. Law § 49-0305 (McKinney Supp. 1985), includes an
example of a statutory easement. One authority believes that the transfer of develop-
ment rights in New York would have its closest affinity to an, "easement in the na-
ture of a profit a prendre." See Pedowitz, supra note 174.
181. Warren's Weed, N.Y Law of Real Property, Easements § 12.01 (4th ed.
1980). The zoning lot merger may be considered unity of ownership as to air rights.
See Times Square Properties v. Al Habb Realty Corp., 117 N.Y.S.2d 901 (N.Y. Sup.
Ct. 1952).
182. For this reason, a mortgagee would be included as a party in interest al-
though it may depend on a due on sale clause in the mortgage. See Axelrod, supra
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The preceding theories regarding whether TDRs are real
property has in a sense already been answered. In New York,
title insurance companies will not insure title to TDRs. 8 3 Ti-
tle insurance companies in New York are limited to insuring
title to real property interests including mortgages and lease-
holds. 8 " TDRs are not considered by the state legislature as
real property interests. 85
Title insurance companies will indirectly insure a zoning
lot merger through the vehicle of a negative easement between
the transferee and transferor. 86 Perhaps, because a title com-
pany will only insure the negative easement, this fact may be
further evidence that the transfer really represents an ease-
ment. 187 The failure, however, of the legislature to define the
development right as an interest in real property has thus
made it directly uninsurable.
Moreover, since a transferable air right is established by
an ordinance it is not a permanent interest, and it is subject
to future change as old planners leave and new ones enter. 88
These transitions create a problem because the right to de-
velop in New York does not vest 89 at the time a Building Per-
mit 90 is issued, but rather at a time when substantial con-
note 107, at 121.
183. Pedowitz, supra note 174, at 197; Rifkin, supra note 29, at 21.
184. Rifkin, supra note 29, at 19.
185. Id.
186. Rifkin, supra note 29, at 21; see 805 Third Ave Co. v. M. W. Realty, 58
N.Y.2d 447, 448 N.E.2d 445, 461 N.Y.S.2d 778 (1983). Where the transferor defaulted
on his obligation to transfer air rights leaving title to the transferred FAR in
controversy.
187. Pedowitz, supra note 174; in agreement, In Re Brause 140 N.Y.L.J. 108
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1958). Presently the only title insurance available is negative easement
for light and air. Cf. Smith, Title Insurance and Zoning Coverage, reprinted in Axel-
rod, supra note 107 where the author advocates that city officials define the legal
nature of certain zoning concepts in order to provide for affirmative insurance
coverage.
188. Pedowitz, supra note 174, at 198.
189. Vesting means the right to continue construction following the issuance of a
building permit, but while a rezoning is occurring. See Ellickson & Turlock, supra
note 32, at 200-12.
190. A building permit is issued by a department of buildings to proceed with
construction according to and under the auspicies of the zoning ordiance. Id.
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struction has occurred. 91 Consequently, the City and the
purchaser of the development rights may not be bound to a
TDR and the transfer would therefore not survive a downzon-
ing in the district where it is located. 192
2. A license air rights development permit
A TDR might best be explained as a licensed air right
permit in quasi real property. 9 3 A license in things other than
the use of real property is a privilege conferred by the state. 94
In this case the license would represent the right or privilege
to build. By transferring this right a transferor would not be
transferring real property in the form of air rights, but rather
he would be negotiating away his right to build and subjecting
his property's development capacity to a state of dormancy. 195
The line between personal property and real property is
not always discernible. Presently, the law has established cer-
tain types of property that at times are real property and at
other times personal property. The law regarding security in-
terest in fixtures is just one example of property that can be
both personal property and real property."9 " Also, New York
cooperative apartment association law deems the shares dis-
tributed to an apartment unit holder as personal property,
even though the shares represent an interest in real prop-
erty. 97 An air rights building permit may similarly be thought
of as personal property or a share of allowable floor area that
may be bought and sold. These shares would remain personal
191. Under New York City's zoning resolution rights under a building permit
generally vest upon the completion of a building foundation. See Temkia v.
Karaghenzoff, 34 N.Y.2d 324, 329, 313 N.E.2d 770, 774, 357 N.Y.S. 2d 470, 474 (1974).
192. Down zoning refers to restricting the potential capacity and intensity of de-
velopment in a given area. See Hinds, Upper East Side Fears Downzoning, N.Y.
Times, June 16, 1985, § 8 (real estate), at 1, col. 5.
193. Costonis, supra note 161.
194. Weed, supra note 173.
195. Costonis, supra note 161, at 586-92.
196. See N.Y.U.C.C. § 9-401 (McKinney Supp. 1984); Garfinkel, How Objects
Become Fixtures, 1 Prac. Real Est. L. 19 (1985).
197. Superior Financial Corp. v. Haskell, 556 F. Supp. 199 (S.D.N.Y. 1983); State
Tax Comm. v. Shorr, 43 N.Y.2d 151, 371 N.E.2d 523, 400 N.Y.S.2d 805 (1977).
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property '98 until the transferee's rights vest through the ac-
tual development of these air rights. After vesting, the air
rights would then represent real property.
V. Conclusion
The controversy surrounding the zoning lot merger in-
vites the conclusion that political expediency is not a panacea
for unsound municipal planning. The § 12-10 resolution is
fraught with inconsistencies that have greatly troubled the
courts. The arguments made in favor of a transfer of air rights
rest on tenuous grounds. Instead, as demonstrated, it is more
practical to define transfer air rights as either a statutorily
prescribed negative easement or as quasi real property in the
form of a government granted license to build.
If the transferred FAR is thought of as a personalty then
the transferring of the floor area could be governed by the
commercial code as are the fixtures. This method would allow
state law to define what a transferred air rights is and who the
parties in interest are. On the other hand, the transferred
floor area may be considered real property and thus subject to
the Real Property Law of New York. Under this interpreta-
tion the parties in interest would be all those parties that
would traditionally have an interest in an easement and it
may be supplemented by including parties such as large space
tenants who have a long term adversely affected interest in
the premises. Finally, if a transferred air right is in actuality
an easement or a negotiable license, it must be so stated and
the rights and interests of the parties must be explicitly de7
fined by the regulatory authorities for such a program to func-
tion in terms of the law and in terms of equity.
Peter Goodman
198. Article 9 also follows a policy of terming certain interests in real property
that have been sold to third parties or traded such as a mortgage backed security as
personal property. See N.Y.U.C.C. § 9-102 comment 4 (McKinney Supp. 1984).
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